Title: The Good Informant Account of Epistemic Trust
By Faik Kurtulmuş (joint work with Gürol Irzik) (Sabancı, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences)
Date: Thursday, April 2, 2026
Time: 1530-1700
Room: Humanities Seminar Room (H-232)
Abstract: In the philosophical literature, trust is often understood as reliance plus some further factor. This paper offers an account of that additional factor in the case of epistemic trust by focusing on the act of informing. Informing someone involves more than sincerely reporting facts. It is a normatively rich act that generates responsibilities for the informer and entitlements for the audience. A good informant must convey relevant information in ways responsive to the audience’s existing knowledge, practical needs, and capacity to understand and use it. We enjoy warranted epistemic trust when we rely on someone because we correctly identify them as a good informant. The good informant account can shed light on the role of values in trust, offer more nuanced diagnoses of claims of mistrust, and help identify sources of inequality in opportunities to enjoy warranted epistemic trust.
About the speaker: Faik Kurtulmuş teaches political philosophy at Sabancı University and received his DPhil in Political Theory from the University of Oxford. His research lies at the intersection of political philosophy, social epistemology, and the philosophy of science. He is particularly interested in how social structures shape what we come to know, and how knowledge in turn affects people’s opportunities to flourish and to exercise agency as free and equal citizens. In 2024, he was awarded the British Academy’s Brian Barry Prize and in His work has appeared in journals including the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Synthese, Journal of Applied Philosophy, Utilitas, and the British Journal of Political Science. He is currently co-authoring a book with Gürol Irzık, provisionally titled Justice in the Distribution of Knowledge, under contract with Oxford University Press.
Organized by the Department of Philosophy
